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TESTIMONY AS TO TRANSACTIONS OR
COMMUNICATIONS WITH
DECEASED PERSONS.
By

GARFIELD S.

CANRIGHT.

The questions which have arisen under Section 4o69 of the
Wisconsin Statutes are many and various. In Dilgervs. McQuade,
158 Wis. 328, 333, Mr. justice Barnes says:
"We have few statutes that the bench and bar have
found it so difficult to understand and apply as sec. 4069."
It is not the purpose of the writer to consider all such questions. Indeed, a reasonably adequate discussion of them would
fill a good-sized volume. This article will be confined to one
question arising under the statute, namely-Who is entitled to
claim the protection of the statute?
Our answer to this question is not intended to be a statement
of the law as established by the Supreme Court of the state
but only what appears to us to be the proper answer. So far as
our reading has led us, we have found no actual decision of the
Supreme Court of this state contrary to the views here expressed,
although it is apparent from a few of the opinions, which will
be referred to later, that the court has not always applied them.
For the convenience of those who may not have the exact
wording of the statute in mind, we are printing herewith so
much of ihe statute as is necessary to a determination of the
question:
"No person * * * in his * * * own behalf or interest
nor any person, * * * through or under whom a party
derives his interest or title, shall be examined as a witness
in respect to any transaction or communication by him
personally with a deceased person * * *,in any civil action
or proceeding in which the opposite party derives his title,
or sustains his liability, to the cause of action from, through
or under such deceased person * * * unless such opposite
party shall first be examined or examine some other witness in, his behalf concerning some transaction or communication between the deceased *** and such party or
person, * * *"
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Evidence as to transactions or communications with a
deceased or insane person is not per se incompetent. The restriction goes to the competency of the witness, not to the competency
of the evidence, and one is not an incompetent witness as to
transactions with a deceased person no matter how interested he
may be in the action unless the "opposite party derives his title,
or sustains his liability, to the cause of action from, through or
under such deceased person."
Some doubt has been expressed among attorneys and by the
courts as to who is meant by the "opposite party." We believe
there can be little room for difference of opinion as to this. The
"opposite party" is the one whose interests are adverse to those
of the
action
party"
whose

party testifying; or, if the witness be not a party to the
but the assignor or grantor of the party, the "opposite
is the one whose interests are adverse to the party on
behalf the testimony is offered.

The questions which seem to have perplexed counsel and
the courts more, are: What is meant by "derives his title" to the
cause of action from a deceased person? What is meant by
"sustains his liability" to the cause of action through a deceased
person? For example:
If an action of ejectment is brought against an occupant of land who holds under a deed from one who has
since died, can the occupant invoke the statute against the
plaintiff? Does he sustain his liability through or under
the deceased?
Can one who demands of the personal representative
of a deceased person a savings bank pass book as a gift
inter vivos from the deceased, object to the competency of
the personal representative as a witness to transactions or
communications with the deceased bearing on the question
of the gift? Does the alleged donee derive his cause of
action from the deceased?
Where an alleged creditor of a deceased person attempts
to establish a claim against the estate of the deceased person, may the executor testify against the claimant as to
transactions or communications with the deceased person?
In a proceeding to probate a will, may the legatees or
heirs of the deceased testify as to transactions with the
deceased?

TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED PERSONS
To answer these questions, we must look to the history and
purpose of the section.
At common law a party was not entitled to testify in his own
behalf under any circumstances. His self-interest disqualified
him. After a long period of time, statutes were passed removing
such disqualification. It was realized, however, that if after the
death of a person another could sue the heirs or legal representatives of such deceased person or could defend in an action
brought by such heirs' or legal representatives to enforce a right
belonging to the deceased, and in either of such actions could
testify in his own behalf as to conversations or transactions had
with the deceased, it would afford great opportunity for persons
to make unjust claims or defenses against the estates of decedents. So the right given to testify in one's own behalf was
limited by providing that such right might not be exercised
where the opposite party derives his title to the cause of action
or sustains his liability from, through or under the deceased as
administrator, heir or other representative of the deceased.
This accounts for the arrangement of Sections 4o68 and
4o69 in the statutes. Section 4o68 provides that one shall not be
disqualified to testify by reason of his interest. Section 4o69
provides that one cannot testify in his own interest as to transactions with a deceased person where the opposite party derives
his cause of action or sustains his liability from, through or
under the deceased. That Section 4o69 is intended only as an
exception to the right conferred by Section 4o68 is shown even
more clearly by Taylor's Statutes of Wisconsin (1871), page
6oo, page 74:
"A party to any civil action or proceeding * * * may
be examined as a witness on his own behalf or in behalf
of any other party in the same manner and subject to the
same rules of examination as any other witness; provided
that the assignor of the thing in action shall not be examined on behalf of said party nor shall a party to an actign
be examined in his own behalf in respect to any transaction or communication had personally by said assignor or
said party respectively with a deceased person against
parties who are executors, administrators, devisees, heirs
at law, next of kin, or assignees of such deceased person
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Section 4069 therefore creates no new disabilities but is
merely a survival of the common law rule relating to testimony
by an interested party. To this extent the common law has not
been abrogated. Any testimony in behalf of a party which was
competent at common law is competent now.
Hanf vs. Northwestern Masonic Assn., 76 Wis. 450.
The section as quoted from Taylor's Statutes is also interesting as showing that at least originally the persons who could
invoke the protection of the statute were only the personal representatives, devisees, heirs, next of kin, or assignees of the
deceased.
The purpose of the statute is well expressed by Mr. Justice
Dixon in Lawrence vs. Vilas, 2o Wis. **381, *386:
"The object of the legislature is plain enough. It was
to prohibit a living party from testifying in behalf of
himself, when, by reason of death, the other party to the
transaction, having had the same knowledge or means of
knowledge, cannot be present in court to confront him or
make his statement of the transaction."
The purpose is even more tersely expressed by Mr. Justice
Winslow in Boyd vs. Gore, 143 Wis. 531, 535:
"*

* * because the mouth of one party is closed by

death, it is only fair that the mouth of the other should
be closed by the law."
With the history and purpose of the statute in mind, we wish
to refer to a few cases for the purpose of applying the statute.
Two cases-In re Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, and Anderson
vs. Laugen, 122 Wis. 57, are instructive particularly when taken
together. Both were proceedings to establish wills of deceased
persons. In the first case the residuary legatee under the will
was not permitted to testify as to transactions with the deceased.
In the latter case one of the proponents, an executor, but having
no interest in the estate, was permitted to testify to such transactions. In both cases the "opposite party"--the heirs of the
deceased-claimed under the deceased, but in the first case the
legatee had a financial interest in the estate which disqualified
her, while in the latter case the executor had not. In both cases
it was held, or assumed, that the heirs are "opposite parties" from
68
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those claiming under the will and as both the heirs and the lega.
tees or devisees under the will claim under the deceased, neither
can testify against the other. This is manifestly sound in proceedings for probate of a will, but it has apparently created an
impression that where an action is brought by or against an
estate of a deceased person a legatee or even an executor is
incompetent to testify as to transactions with the deceased.
Schultz vs. Culbertson, 125 Wis. 169, was an action against
the executrix of one James Culbertson for the conversion of
certain logs which the plaintiff claimed to have obtained by virtue
of contract with Culbertson. The action was originally commenced against Culbertson, but he having died, the executrix was
substituted as the defendant. The lower court refused to permit
the executrix, who was also the widow of Culbertson, to testify
as to the conduct and conversations of the deceased for the purpose of proving mental incapacity. The Supreme Court held that
the executrix could have testified to acts, conduct or transactions
had by the deceased withinher observation, if wholly unparticipated in or uninfluenced by her. The defendant in this case was
not only executrix, but also had a financial interest in the estate
of the deceased.
In Will of Klehr, 147 Wis. 653, which involved a claim
against the estate of the deceased based on a note which a sister
claimed was given to her by the deceased as a gift, attorneys for
the claimant objected to the competency of the executor to testify
on behalf of the estate as to declarations of the deceased affecting
the validity of the gift. The court did not decide the question
saying, at page 656:
"The members of this court are not in accord upon
this question, and since the judgment below must be reversed on other grounds we will not pass upon the competency of the executor to testify."
Weissman vs. Weissman, 156 Wis. 26, was an action of
replevin brought by the administratrix of the estate of her husband. She was also sole heir of the deceased. The administratrix
was permitted by the lower court to testify, over the objection
of the defendant, that the defendant brought the property in
question to their farm, and said he gave it to them and they
could do what they liked with it. This was assigned as error.
69
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The court indicated that if it had been shown that the witness
participated in the conversation she would have been incompetent
to testify thereto.
It will be observed that in two of the above cases the court
assumed that the executrix was incompetent to testify as to
transactions with the deceased in which she took part, and in
the other case the court could not agree as to whether the executor was incompetent to testify.
In our view of the law, the executor or executrix in each
of the cases was competent to testify fully as to transactions with
the deceased. Why should not the executrix in Schultz vs. CulThe
bertson testify as to conversations with the deceased?
plaintiff (the opposite party), the one whose interests were
adverse to the witness, did not derive his title to the cause of
action from the deceased so the statute does not apply. The
plaintiff may have obtained title to the property from the
deceased, but not to the cause of action. The cause of action
arose out of the acts of the deceased in converting the logs. If
one violates the rights of another, thus giving rise to a cause of
action, it cannot well be said that the other derived his title to the
cause of action from the one who violated his rights.
In Will of Klehr it did not appear that the executor had any
interest in the estate. It is difficult to perceive, therefore, why
he should be deemed an incompetent witness under Section 4069.
But even if the executor had an interest in the estate, what reason
is there for disqualifying him? It may be true that the plaintiff
received the chose in action, which was the basis of the suit, from
the deceased, but the chose in action is quite a different thing
from the cause of action. The cause of action did not arise until
there was a failure to pay the chose in action in accordance with
its terms. When the deceased failed to pay, in accordance with
the terms of the instrument, a cause of action arose, but it was a
cause of action which never belonged to the deceased but was
rather a cause against him. The cause of action from the time
of its creation was the property of the claimant. It cannot be
said, therefore, that she derived her title to the cause from the
person against whom it existed from the beginning.
So also with reference to Weissman vs. Weissman--VWhy
should not the administratrix, although she was sole heir of the
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deceased, testify that the defendant had given the property to her
husband, at least insofar as the objection thereto was based on
the provisions of Section 4069?
It is true, the court did not hold that the testimony was
incompetent, but it implies very strongly that if the decedent
were present at the time of the communication or transaction, the
testimony would have been incompetent.
The court says:
"Although the plaintiff claimed title under or through
the deceased it was not shown that the decedent was
present at the time this admission was made or that the
admission was part of any communication or transaction
between the defendant and the deceased or between witness and deceased. Counsel should have brought out the
fact, if it was a fact, that the decedent was present, or
that the alleged admissions were part of a communication
or transaction between defendant and deceased. This he
neglected to do."
The fact that the plaintiff claimed title under the deceased
should not disqualify her. The statute does not disqualify one
who claims under the deceased. It disqualifies one only where
the "opposite party" claims under the deceased. The statute
recognizes that the one who does derive his title to the cause of
action from the deceased may testify, for it provides, in substance,
that if the opposite party who derives his title to the cause of
action or sustains his liability thereto be examined, or examine
some other witness in his behalf, then the one who is adverse to
the representative of the deceased may introduce testimony. If
the one who claimed title through or under the deceased could
not introduce testimony, there would be no reason for the last
half of the section.
Furthermore, let us apply the reason for the statute as
announced by the Supreme Court, namely-It was to prohibit a
living party testifying in behalf of himself when by reason of
death the other party to the transaction cannot be present in
court to make his statement of the transaction.
In the Weissman case why should not the administratrix
testify that the defendant had given the property to herself and
her husband? The defendant's mouth was not closed by death.
71

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

If he did not give the property to the deceased and his wife, he
could so testify. The statute was not designed to close the mouth
of the representative of the deceased, but of one making a claim
against him.
We submit for consideration this test: Who stands in the
shoes of the deceased? If the deceased were alive and such action
should be brought, would the testimony offered be to his financial
interest? Would the witness be testifying in behalf of deceased?
If he would be, then the witness is competent to testify as to the
transactions with the deceased. If the testimony offered would
be contrary to the financial interests of the deceased, were he
alive, then the witness is incompetent.
In most cases, the opposite party, against whom the testimony
cannot be given, will be found to be the personal representative,
heir, legatee, or devisee of the deceased, and the party disqualified
from testifying will be the one having a claim against the estate
of the deceased. Under our construction of the statute we cannot conceive of a case brought against or by the estate of a
deceased person in which the executor or administrator of the
estate would not be a competent witness to testify as to transactions with the deceased person, even though he be also a legatee
or devisee under the will, or an heir of the deceased. This, we
believe, was the purpose of the statute. The result of any other
construction is, that not only is the mouth of the deceased closed
by death, but also the mouth of those who act for him is closed
by law. The manifest purpose of the law-was to afford protection
for the estates of deceased persons, not to deprive them of all
protection. Our answer to the question under consideration
therefore is that the personal representatives, heirs, legatees and
devisees are the ones who are entitled to claim the protection of
the statute and, except in proceedings to probate a will, the
statute cannot be invoked against them. As stated in the beginning, we do not know of an actual decision in a case in this
state which is contrary to the construction given, though the
inference to be drawn from the three cases cited seems to be at
variance therewith.

